

Envisioning Active Surveillance:

Public Health Perspective

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
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Best Practices Legacy-Drag

New Digital Health Infrastructure Demands New Best Practices

Devices are infrastructure components

- Human infrastructure
- Health system infrastructure
- Community infrastructure

- The nation's healthcare system operates on a national biomedical device network
- The connected care environment has evolved more rapidly than associated best practices
- The 'health system' has not adequately budgeted or committed to important practices needed to secure today's health system infrastructure
 - Assessment of devices
 - Cyber-security exercises
 - Monitoring
 - Updating and patching

Cyber-safety risk can be mitigated through engineering practices Benefits patients, health systems and manufacturers



Institute of Medicine Health Care Quality AIMS

- Safe Avoiding preventable injuries, reducing medical errors
- Effective Providing services based on scientific knowledge (clinical guidelines)
- Patient centered Care that is respectful and responsive to individuals
- Efficient Avoiding wasting time and other resources
- Timely Reducing wait times, improving the practice flow
- Equitable Consistent care regardless of patient characteristics and demographics

The medical devices are a core component of healthcare quality



Connected Health: Benefit Versus Risk Defining a Public Health Problem

- Three parameters define the importance of a public health problem
 - Breadth of exposure, e.g. incidence/prevalence
 - Depth if impact, e.g. morbidity and mortality
 - Preventability



Safety Perspectives The Numbers are Impressive

Estimating patient exposures to digitally enabled and networked medical devices

- 1. One billion encounters per year
- Each encounter, on average, has 10 exposures to a medical device
- 3. Assume 10 years of legacy risk as the national healthcare landscape will continue to have inadequately secured devices
- 4. Over ten years, 100 billion patient exposures with medical devices

Exploring Probability of Adverse Events

Adverse Event Rate	Adverse Events
1% (.01)	10,000,000
0.10% (.001)	1,000,000
0.01% (.0001)	100,000
0.001% (.00001)	10,000
0.0001% (.000001)	1,000


What would Dr. Semmelweis say?



Jurisdictional Chasms Patient Safety Challenges Across 'Infrastructures'

Stakeholders, priorities, policy, etc. varies by jurisdiction

Focus Area	Oversight Organization
Device Characteristics	FDA
Hospital & Device Networks	Joint Commission HFAP* DNV*
Community / Critical Infrastructure	DHS State/Local Health Departments



Healthcare Facilities Accreditation Program (HFAP)

[·] Det Norske Veritas Healthcare, Inc. (DNV)




Public Health Systems Approach



EBS – Evidence based science



Impact Driven Surveillance




Source: Public Health Foundation



Vaccine Safety Monitoring Portfolio of Systems

Portfolio of Systems



VAERS

- Passive surveillance system
- Provides source for potential safety signals

VSD

- Automated data collection from 9 health care organizations
- Rapid Cycle Analysis (RCA) allows VSD to detect adverse events following vaccination in near real-time so the public can be informed quickly of possible risks
- Also supports research with near-complete capture of all vaccinated children



VSD Active Surveillance Experience

Abstract

OBJECTIVE:

To describe the Vaccine Safety Datalink (VSD) project's experience with **population-based**, active surveillance for vaccine safety and draw lessons that may be useful for similar efforts.

PATIENTS AND METHODS:

The VSD comprises a population of 9.2 million people annually in 8 geographically diverse US health care organizations. Data on vaccinations and diagnoses are updated and extracted weekly. The safety of 5 vaccines was monitored, each with 5 to 7 prespecified outcomes. With sequential analytic methods, the number of cases of each outcome was compared with the number of cases observed in a comparison group or the number expected on the basis of background rates. If the test statistic exceeded a threshold, it was a signal of a possible vaccine-safety problem. Signals were investigated by using temporal scan statistics and analyses such as logistic regression.

RESULTS:

<u>Ten signals appeared over 3 years</u> of surveillance: <u>1 signal</u> was reported to external stakeholders and ultimately <u>led to a change in national vaccination policy</u>, and <u>9 signals were found to be spurious</u> after rigorous internal investigation. <u>Causes of spurious signals included imprecision in estimated background rates, changes in true incidence or coding over time, other confounding, inappropriate comparison groups, miscoding of outcomes in electronic medical records, and chance. In the absence of signals, estimates of adverse-event rates, relative risks, and attributable risks from up-to-date VSD data have provided rapid assessment of vaccine safety to policy-makers when concerns about a specific vaccine have arisen elsewhere.</u>

CONCLUSIONS:

Care with data quality, outcome definitions, comparison groups, and length of surveillance are required to enable detection of true safety problems while minimizing false signals. Some causes of false signals in the VSD system were preventable and have been corrected, whereas others will be unavoidable in any active surveillance system. Temporal scan statistics, analyses to control for confounding, and chart review are indispensable tools in signal investigation. The VSD's experience may inform new systems for active safety surveillance.



Measuring Surveillance System Performance

Does it work? Is it useful? **Key System attributes** Use of information Simplicity Users Flexibility • Data quality Actions taken Acceptability Impact Sensitivity Positive predictive value Representativeness Methods Timeliness Driven Stability




Digital Infrastructure Fully Tapped Use the Data – Secure the Infrastructure

- Consortium driven collaboration
 - Supports innovation, scalability, impact and sustainability
- Translation of a technology problem (cyber risk) into a healthcare delivery solution
 - Patient centric, care delivery centric and population centric approaches)
- Development of novel
 - Data assets for device cyber risk exposure
 - Analytics to assess impact of cyber risk exposure on device in the care delivery areas under study
 - Analytics to detect patient safety signals related to medical device cyber risk exposure



Medical Device CVSS Contextualizing Vulnerability



CVSS – Common Vulnerability Severity Score




Medical Device CVSS Public Health Initiative

Vulnerability Databases MDVISI Mnfctr Dir Manufacturers General Device Data MD-**NVDB** Specific Health Systems HDO Dir




DRAP Digital Infrastructure: Risk and Reward








Who's Responsible Origins, Destinations, Directions





MDRAP Screenshot Risk Graphic with Magic Quadrant Visualization


Uses the "Magic Quadrant" graphic display to improve management's understanding of the risks



*Level of effort is similar to cost



Market-based public health: collaborative acceleration





A Cyber Security Public Health Initiative

- MDRAP, MDVISI and MDSATI: Key Attributes of Cyber Surveillance Programs
 - A non-profit initiative
 - A community-driven collaborative based on broad stakeholder input including manufacturers, health systems, technology companies and government agencies
 - Supported by the Department of Homeland Security, Cyber Security Division; working with ICS-CERT
 - Closely integrated with the programs of the National Health Information Sharing and Analysis Center (NHISAC)
 - Participating in the NIST National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCOE) medical device cybersecurity program
 - Collaborating with FDA on development of new surveillance and safety assessment methods
 - Coordinating with HHS Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response
 - Representatives on the NMDES Planning Board and the ONC HIT Standards FACA

Opportunity for 'dual use'

- Cyber and non-cyber
- Person
- Health system
- Critical infrastructure





The Surveillance Loop: Impact Assessed

